This paper constructs a differential game model of reciprocal dumping to reconsider the welfare effects of trade liberalization (tariff reductions). We show that welfare in autarky exceeds welfare in trade for any tariff level, namely that any trade is detrimental. Comparing our result with a static result, we discuss that the closed-loop property of feedback strategies in differential games plays a significant role in our argument.
Introduction
While multilateral trade liberalization has greatly progressed over the last 50 years, there has been persistent resistance to globalization. One of the tasks of international economics is to make clear why such anti-globalization remains, despite the fact that the fruits of globalization are spreading around the world. We can find some literature answering this concern by showing a possibility of Pareto inferior trade, i.e. all countries lose from trade. Typical examples include Kemp and Long (1979) and Tran-Nam (1985) in a context of overlapping generations and Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) and Shy (1988) under market incompleteness. 1 This paper seeks another source of Pareto inferior trade and anti-globalization in an oligopolistic context. For this purpose, we extend Benchekroun's (2003) dynamic duopoly model to international trade engaged by home and foreign firms like Brander
A Model
The model is a combination of Benchekroun's (2003) dynamic duopoly model and a reciprocal dumping model of Brander (1981) , Brander and Krugman (1983) , Brander and Spencer (1984) , and Helpman and Krugman (1985) . Suppose there are two symmetric countries (Home and Foreign), two goods (Goods 1 and 2) and one factor (labor). All the Foreign variables are asterisked. Good 1 is a non-numeraire good and Good 2 a numeraire good both of which are produced from labor. Without loss of generality, one unit of labor produces one unit of Good 2 so that the wage rate is fixed to unity. Production of Good 1, which is nationally monopolized, incurs a constant marginal cost c ≥ 0 and exports are subject to a specific tariff τ.
4 Letting x (resp. y) and x * (resp. y * ) denote the supply into the Home market and the Foreign market by the Home (resp. Foreign) firm, demand is given by a linear function: In supplying Good 1, a country-specific stock of a renewable resource S and S * is exploited. 6 We assume the following resource dynamics: 
where r ≥ 0 is a constant rate of discount.
Feedback Nash equilibria
This section derives a (linear) feedback Nash equilibrium of the above dynamic game.
8 To this end, set up the Home firm's Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation: ,  ,  ma  ,  x , , , ,
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where V(S,S * ) is a value function of the Home firm and, ( ) Suppose that each firm's strategy is linear in the state variables. As is proved in Appendix A, the Home firm's equilibrium outputs are obtained as x = αS + β and x * = αS * + β * , where
Similarly, the Foreign firm's outputs are y = αS + β * and y * = αS * + β. Two points deserve attention. First, we see that x (resp. x * ) and y * (resp. y) have the same functional form, i.e., x = αS + β and y * = αS * + β because the two countries are identical in all respects and feedback strategies are separable in S and S * . Therefore, we On the other hand, substituting α = (6k -3r)/8 into (5), we obtain
Henceforth, we make a technical assumption to facilitate analysis.
9
Assumption 2k -5r > 0.
Roughly speaking, this assumption requires the renewable property of the resource be significantly relevant. Utilizing (4) and (6), we proceed to characterize the feedback strategies of each firm. Setting αS + β * = 0, the export is zero if S is so small that S < -β * /α. In the other extreme case, the export is given by the static one x * = (a -c -2τ)/3 if S becomes large enough to have S ≥ (a -c + τ -3β * )/3α by setting αS + β * = (a -c -2τ)/3. What is further noted is that the domestic supply exhibits jumps at these two thresholds of S 10 . This is because the supply into the domestic market switches at S = -β * /α and S = (a -c + τ -3β * )/3α. In view of these and using the approach in Benchekroun (2003 Benchekroun ( , 2008 and Lohoues (2006) , the following results can be obtained.
9 Benchekroun (2003 Benchekroun ( , 2008 Eq. (7) can be interpreted diagrammatically as illustrated in Figure 1 . It states that static Cournot outputs cannot be sustained for ever unless S is sufficiently large. Depending on parameters, there can be multiple steady states but we are interested only in the steady state where supplies are increasing in S since the case with static Cournot outputs contains nothing new.
welfare, which is composed of consumer surplus, the Home firm's profit and tariff revenue:
x y a c x y x a c x y x y .
In the steady state associated with x = αS + β and y = αS + β * , the steady state stock
. Substituting this into (7) and considering the symmetry between countries, the steady state supply into the domestic market and export are respectively obtained as
Substituting these into (8), using (4) and (6), and rearranging terms, steady state welfare in the asymptotically stable feedback Nash equilibrium is explicitly computed as follows. 
The rest of our task is to closely examine the properties of W(τ) and compare it with welfare under autarky, i.e. the monopoly equilibrium without foreign entry:
12 Derivation is omitted since it is a merely tedious calculation. Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) Proof. See Figure 2 and Appendix B. 
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We see that under autarky the static monopoly output x = (a -c)/2 is an equilibrium output, which allows us to reach (10).
14 We should note some limitations of comparing steady state welfare. Substituting (4) and (6) into the second threshold in (7), each firm chooses static output for
If both countries are in the autarkic steady state, the resource stock is (a -c)/2k. Accordingly, starting from this steady state, each firm sets static Cournot outputs just after opening of trade, i.e., x = y = (a -c)/3. Under this choice, S decreases over time and firms switch from static outputs to x = αS + β and y = αS + β * .
Our analysis rules out this transition from the autarkic steady state to the trading steady state. 15 A similar figure can be obtained in static models as well, which is left to Appendix C.
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Figure 2: Losses from trade under the feedback strategy
Henceforth, let us interpret this proposition intuitively. We first consider why Pareto inferior trade is possible. A tariff reduction has two effects, which arise in static models as well. On the one hand, it shifts a part of the Home firm's profit to the Foreign firm. This profit-shifting effect reduces the Home welfare. On the other hand, freer trade promotes competition, which has a favorable effect by raising consumer surplus. It is ambiguous whether tariff revenue increases as a result of trade liberalization since it lowers τ while y increases. In static settings, the positive effects safely dominate the negative effects, which leads to welfare gains as compared to autarky. In other words, welfare monotonically increases with a reduction in τ.
However, another effect arises in our dynamic model, which can be called a closedloop effect through the change in S. To understand this better, suppose that the Home firm expands output. This will decrease S by accelerating the resource exploitation. In response to this decrease in S, the Foreign firm will decrease output from the fact that the feedback Nash strategy y(S) = αS + β * is increasing in S. As a result of the Foreign firm's output contraction, S will increase but this is insufficient to offset the first decrease in S. Therefore, trade liberalization or allowing foreign entry decreases the steady state level of S and total supply, namely, more trade is anti-competitive. This closed-loop effect causes welfare losses relative to autarky.
In addition, we should draw attention to the fact that U ≠ W(τ). The closed-loop effect plays an important role behind this fact as well as the above proposition. As Footnote 13 reports, the static monopoly outcome becomes an autarkic equilibrium. This is because the monopolist's payoff contains no state variable. However, the analogy does not apply to duopoly and each firm's equilibrium strategy becomes dependent on S as in (10). Accordingly, even by evaluating W(τ) at τ, it does not coincide with the autarkic welfare U. This is another important but not well-known property the feedback strategy possesses. Figure 2 convinces us that positive trade gains are possible if both countries adjust import subsidies which are close to τ . However, such a case seems so unrealistic that it is almost impossible to achieve gainful trade.
Our finding reports a relevance of dynamic considerations since it tells us that predictions from static theory no longer survive a dynamic model depending on situations. According to our result, there is a theoretical rationale for anti-globalization: the opening of trade necessarily leads to welfare losses.
Concluding Remarks
We have clarified that the closed-loop property of feedback strategies in differential games can be a source of losses from trade. Our result suggests that predictions on trade gains based on static models do not always support globalization affirmatively. Once the model is modified to accommodate dynamics, anti-globalization can be reasonable. In this sense, our attempt will be useful in making economic policies on international trade.
Nevertheless, we must recognize that we have resorted to a very specific model, which rests on numerous assumptions. First, we have confined attention to steady states and have not addressed what would happen along the transition path. Second, we have made canonical assumptions such as linear demand and constant marginal cost. Finally, it is more desirable to consider a stagewise game where each country's government non-cooperatively chooses tariffs and then firms play a Cournot game. It is our future research agenda to address these and examine the robustness of the result.
A. Derivations of Coefficients
This appendix derives α,β and β * in (4) and (5). From (3), the first-order conditions for maximizing the right-hand side are
where subscripts S and S * represent a partial derivative. Letting V * (S,S * ) be the Foreign firm's value function, the conditions that parallel (11) are obtained:
Solving (11) and (12) 
Suppose that each firm's value function is quadratic in the state variables: 
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Subtracting the second equation from the first equation and rearranging terms yield Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) [255] [256] [257] [258] [259] [260] [261] [262] [263] [264] [265] [266] [267] [268] [269] [270] 266 from which we have A = A * . Applying the same procedure to the terms multiplied by S *2 gives C = C * . Further substitution of these results into the terms multiplied by SS * and rearranging the resulting expressions, we reach that E = E * = 0. Accordingly, the value functions turn to be separable in S and S * . Moreover, applying A = A * , C = C * and E = E * = 0 in the coefficients attached to S 2 and S 2*
, we finally get A = C = 0, -9(2k -r)/8. Note that A = C = 0 yields static Cournot outputs.
The other coefficients are now computed. B and B * (resp. D and D * ) are the solutions to the system of equations obtained by setting the terms multiplied by S (resp. S * ) to zero. 
When A = -9(2k -r)/8, these coefficients are further rewritten as
Substituting these results into x,x * ,y and y * , the explicit form of (interior) feedback strategies is derived as follows. 
B. Properties of W(τ)
This appendix proves some of the key properties of W(τ) in Figure 2 . Let us begin by comparing welfare under free trade with τ = 0 and welfare under autarky (10). Setting τ = 0 in (9), we have Kenji Fujiwara Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) 
Taking the ratio between W(0) and U yields 2 (0) 4(2 5 )(10 13 ) 27(2 3 )
We easily see that this is less than one since subtracting the denominator from the numerator equals -(2k + 3)(14k -17r) < 0. Therefore, autarky is Pareto superior to free trade.
We proceed to computing welfare under the prohibitive tariff and compare it with welfare under autarky. The prohibitive tariff denoted by τ is obtained by setting y = 0 in (7) and has an explicit form 8( )( ) 10 13
Note that W(τ) ≠ U under the feedback strategy so that we cannot regard W(τ) as an autarkic level of welfare. 16 Substituting τ into (9), W(τ) becomes ( ) 2 2 3(2 5 )(6 7 )( ) 2(10 13 )
Let us take the ratio between W(τ) and U:
( ) 2 4(2 5 )(5 7 ) (10 13 )
Subtracting the denominator from the numerator yields Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) 255-270 268 which proves to be larger than one since the difference between the numerator and the denominator is (10k -13r) 3 -27(2k -3r) 2 (6k -7r) = 8(2k -3r) 3 + (6k -7r) 3 + 3(2k + r)(2k -3r)(6k -7r) > 0.
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Comparing W(0),W( τ ) and U, we have the ranking of U > W(0) > W( τ ) as is depicted in Figure 2 . As a result, we have confirmed that welfare under any positive level of tariff is below U.
Our next task is to know how W(τ) depends on τ globally. To see this, let us derive the first and second derivatives of (9) with respect to τ: Figure 2 . In other words, if both countries choose τ , they gain from trade.
C. Static Cournot Outcomes
This appendix briefly addresses what consequences follow if static Cournot outputs were to be chosen. Since this is a simple routine, we sketch only the core result. Static Cournot outputs are 
Substituting these into (9), a country's welfare depends on τ as follows. 
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Differentiating (15) 
